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Introduction 
In Padilla v. Kentucky,1 the United States Supreme Court vacated the 
guilty plea of a legal permanent resident, ruling that the defendant’s 
attorney provided him constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.2  
The defendant pleaded guilty to felony drug charges after his attorney 
advised him that he would not suffer any adverse immigration 
consequences.3  After his guilty plea, the defendant became subject to 
deportation proceedings.4 
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to correctly 
advise defendants of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.5  
Lower courts had required counsel to advise clients only regarding the 
direct consequences of a guilty plea and not for collateral consequences 
(i.e., those occurring outside the sentencing process).6  After acknowledging 
lower court precedent, the Court noted that it has never required such a 
distinction in deciding ineffective assistance of counsel cases.7  Yet, the 
Court was silent as to the retroactive application of Padilla and so provided 
little guidance for the lower courts.8 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that counsel must 
inform clients of the deportation risks resulting from a guilty plea).  The Court continued:  
“Our longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a 
consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living 
lawfully in this country demand no less.”  Id. 
 2. See id. at 1486–87 (finding that Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally deficient 
and remanding to determine whether Padilla can show prejudice in order to gain relief). 
 3. Id. at 1478. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. at 1483 (requiring that, at a minimum, counsel advise that pleading guilty 
may carry adverse immigration consequences but that “when the deportation consequence is 
truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear”). 
 6. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss:  Collateral Consequences, 
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124–25 
(2009) (noting that most jurisdictions do not require a defendant to be informed of collateral 
consequences regardless of severity); see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (observing that the “longstanding and unanimous position of the federal courts” 
only required counsel to advise clients of direct consequences and noting that the Supreme 
Court has never required advice on collateral consequences such as civil commitment, 
ineligibility to possess firearms, and dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces). 
 7. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (acknowledging that lower courts have applied the 
distinction, but adding that the Court did not need to consider the distinction’s value because 
of the “unique nature of deportation”). 
 8.  See id. at 1486 (requiring counsel in future cases to inform clients of deportation 
risks but remaining silent as to the retroactive application of the decision). 
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The stories of three defendants illustrate the inconsistent reaction of 
lower courts to Padilla.  These cases, presented below, demonstrate the 
confusion in Padilla’s wake as to whether Padilla applies retroactively or 
not, and whether its holding is limited to the immigration context. 
On December 3, 2003, Roselva Chaidez, a legal permanent resident, 
considered entering a guilty plea to charges of mail fraud.9  Ms. Chaidez 
moved to the United States in the 1970’s and, as of 2003, was living with 
her children and grandchildren.10  Ms. Chaidez managed to avoid jail; the 
plea was for four years’ probation.11  Ms. Chaidez was not informed of any 
immigration consequences, and she only learned that deportation 
proceedings had begun against her after she filed for citizenship.12  Nearly 
two years after requesting citizenship, Ms. Chaidez was called before an 
immigration court that informed her the government was going to deport 
her.13  Suddenly, she risked being forced to leave her family and her home 
of forty years.  Then, two days before the Supreme Court heard arguments 
in Padilla, Chaidez filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging 
that the court accepting her plea and her counsel both failed to advise her of 
the immigration consequences of her plea.14 
Before Padilla, no Supreme Court precedent existed requiring such 
advice.15  After Padilla, the District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois decided that Padilla applies retroactively to Chaidez’s coram nobis 
petition and ordered an evidentiary hearing.16  Then, in a later opinion after 
the hearing, the same court found that Chaidez is entitled to relief from her 
guilty plea.17 
                                                                                                                 
 9. United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 6, 2010). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the majority 
cites no Supreme Court or federal case that has shared Padilla’s holding). 
 16. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F.Supp. 2d 896, 904–05 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(finding no retroactivity problem raised by Ms. Chaidez’s claim and stating what Ms. 
Chaidez must show in order to prevail at the evidentiary hearing). 
 17. See United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3–4 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 6, 2010) (granting relief because Ms. Chaidez proved that she would have risked 
trial for the opportunity to fight deportation rather than acquiesce to near automatic 
deportation by pleading guilty). 
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In 1999, Lincoln Miller, a lawful permanent resident since 1981, who 
lived in New York with his wife of 24 years, pleaded guilty in a Maryland 
court to possession of 448 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute.18  He 
served five years.19  Fatefully, Mr. Miller took a trip to Belize in 2008, and 
upon his return, was detained by immigration officials at the airport.20  
Facing deportation, four years after his release from prison, Mr. Miller filed 
a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to attack his guilty plea on 
grounds that he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his 
guilty plea.21  The Special Court of Appeals of Maryland denied Mr. Miller 
relief.22  The court concluded that deportation is a collateral consequence of 
a guilty plea and that Padilla announced a new rule that does not apply 
retroactively.23 
A third case highlights the possibility that Padilla applies beyond 
immigration, which adds more impact to the retroactivity issue.24  Gary 
Bauder, a United States citizen, pled no contest to charges of 
aggravated stalking of a minor in 2002.25  His plea agreement detailed 
his punishment but did not mention potential civil commitment, and 
his attorney assured him that he could not be subject to involuntary 
civil commitment as a result of pleading guilty.26  Nonetheless, Bauder 
has been involuntarily civilly committed since 2007.27  The Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals used Padilla in affirming the district court, 
which granted Mr. Bauder relief on his habeas corpus petition.28  Mr. 
Bauder pleaded guilty before Padilla and nothing in his case involved 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 355 (affirming the denial of defendant’s petition for coram nobis). 
 23. See id. at 352 (surveying precedent that labels deportation a collateral consequence 
and concluding that Padilla overruled a “monolith” of precedent and therefore created a new 
rule that cannot be applied retroactively). 
 24. See Bauder v. Dep’t. of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that 
when the law is ambiguous, a criminal defense attorney must inform his client of any 
adverse collateral consequences). 
 25. Id. at 1273. 
 26. Id. at 1273–74. 
 27. Id. at 1273 n.2. 
 28. See id. at 1275 (quoting Padilla to observe that at a minimum, even when the law 
is unclear, attorneys must advise clients of possible “adverse [collateral] consequences”).  
Notably, in quoting Padilla, the Eleventh Circuit changed “immigration” to “[collateral].”  
Id. 
WHAT’S NEW IS OLD AGAIN 99 
immigration.29  Within six months of the Supreme Court decision, the 
Eleventh Circuit extended the reasoning of Padilla to civil 
commitment for sexual offenders.30 
Three defendants similarly situated yet disparately disposed.  
Courts will continue to face Sixth Amendment claims by defendants 
seeking to vacate guilty pleas entered prior to the Padilla decision—
both within and outside the immigration context.  Different 
conclusions in the Third and Seventh Circuits illustrate the ongoing 
issue.  The Third Circuit unanimously held that Padilla applies 
retroactively.31  Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit—over a dissent—
reversed Chaidez, holding that Padilla announced a new rule and 
therefore does not apply retroactively.32 
Ironically, Mr. Miller’s case was also reversed on appeal.33  The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the reasoning of the Northern 
District of Illinois, while the Seventh Circuit reached the same 
conclusion as the lower Maryland court.34  So, both Ms. Chaidez and 
Mr. Miller still received different outcomes for their similar situation.  
In 2010, the United States deported 168,532 noncitizens convicted of 
crimes and, as of June 30, 2009, 95,000 noncitizens remained 
incarcerated.35  Many of these criminal defendants may have valid 
claims under Padilla.  And these numbers do not consider the number 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 1275 (explaining that counsel was deficient for affirmatively misadvising 
Mr. Bauder regarding the civil commitment consequences of his guilty plea). 
 31. See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We therefore hold 
that, because Padilla followed directly from Strickland and long-established professional 
norms, it is an ‘old rule’ for Teague purposes and is retroactively applicable on collateral 
review.”).  Judge Chagares concurred regarding the majority’s retroactivity analysis but 
dissented on the merits of Orocio’s ineffectiveness claim.  Id. at 647. 
 32. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because we 
conclude that Padilla announced a new rule that does not fall within either of Teague’s 
exceptions, we reverse the judgment of the district court.”). 
 33. See Miller v. State, ____ A.3d ___, 2011 WL 5902523, *1 (Md. 2011) (vacating 
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in light of Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914 
(Md. 2011)). 
 34. See Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 923–24 (Md. 2011) (concluding that Padilla 
applies retroactively); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686 (concluding that Padilla announced a new 
rule that does not apply retroactively). 
 35. Gray Proctor & Nancy King, Post Padilla:  Padilla’s Puzzles for Review in State 
and Federal Courts, 23 FED. SENT’G. REP. 239, 239 (2011); DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, Table 38, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/table38d.xls (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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of defendants subject to civil commitment, much less defendants 
subject to other serious collateral consequences such as registration 
and civil commitment for sex offenders, the loss of civic rights, or 
government benefits.36  Nor do those numbers mention noncitizens 
living in the United States who have yet to cross paths with the 
criminal justice system. 
This Note will show that, to decide Padilla, the Court 
straightforwardly applied its ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrine.37  Under the Court’s retroactivity doctrine, such a 
straightforward application of clearly established law, especially in a 
factually intensive context, leads to retroactive application of a 
decision by the Court.38  Thus, Padilla applies retroactively.39  And 
those who pleaded guilty prior to the Padilla decision can benefit from 
its holding, provided they can show that they were prejudiced by not 
being advised about the deportation consequences of their pleas.40 
Ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine begins with the Supreme 
Court case Strickland v. Washington.41  Strickland set up a two-prong 
test for courts to use in determining whether counsel met the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment:  whether counsel was 
constitutionally deficient and whether the defendant was prejudiced by 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 124 (listing serious consequences that can follow 
criminal convictions and are often categorized as collateral); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that requiring advice regarding 
collateral consequences has “no logical stopping point” and listing other collateral 
consequences (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88) (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 37. See Proctor & King, supra note 35, at 241 (“The Court in Padilla relied on an 
unqualified application of the well-known standard that it had first applied in 
Strickland . . . .”).  “Padilla is like other Strickland progeny that apply retroactively.”  Id. 
 38. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5 (E.D. 
Cal. July 1, 2010) (referencing Supreme Court precedent to demonstrate that rules of general 
application requiring case-by-case examination apply retroactively because they do not 
create a new rule (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000); Wright v. West, 505 
U.S. 277, 308–09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 39. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F.Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(“Accordingly, . . . Padilla did not announce a new rule . . . and [applies retroactively].”). 
 40. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an 
easy task . . . a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain 
would have been rational under the circumstances.”) (citations omitted). 
 41. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a convicted 
defendant can successfully claim ineffective assistance of counsel by showing both that 
counsel’s performance was deficient and also that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant). 
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the constitutionally deficient performance.42  In Hill v. Lockhart,43 the 
Court applied Strickland to guilty pleas and modified the prejudice 
prong to require a showing that, but for counsel’s deficient advice, a 
defendant would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty.44 
Retroactivity analysis begins with the Supreme Court case Teague v. 
Lane.45  In Teague, the Court ruled that “new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become 
final before the new rules are announced.”46  The Court suggested that 
retroactivity should be addressed as a threshold question in any case 
announcing a new rule and that new rules are defined as “break[ing] new 
ground” or when a result is “not dictated by precedent existing at the time 
the defendant’s conviction became final.”47 
Thus, if Padilla announced a new rule of constitutional criminal 
procedure, defendants collaterally attacking their guilty pleas would be 
unable to benefit from the decision.48  However, because Padilla merely 
applied Strickland to the facts of the case and precedent dictated the result, 
Padilla did not announce a new rule.49  Because Padilla is not a new rule, 
defendants who pleaded guilty without advice regarding potentially adverse 
immigration consequences may have a remedy through collateral review of 
those guilty pleas.50 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See id. (explaining deficient performance as “counsel ma[king] errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment” and that prejudice exists where “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”). 
 43. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding that the two-prong 
Strickland test applies when defendants challenge guilty pleas based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
 44. See id. at 59 (“[T]o satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”). 
 45. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989) (holding that petitioner’s proposed 
new rule “should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review”). 
 46. Id. at 310. 
 47. See id. at 300–01 (suggesting retroactivity be addressed as a threshold to maintain 
fairness among all persons similarly situated and admitting the difficulty in defining new 
rules for retroactivity purposes). 
 48. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (remaining silent as to the retroactive application of 
the decision). 
 49. See id. at 1482–84 (applying the analysis in Strickland to the facts of Padilla). 
 50. See id. at 1485 (“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task . . . .  [A] 
petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been 
rational under the circumstances.”). 
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This Note demonstrates why Padilla did not announce a new rule.  In 
Part I, I review the Padilla decision in detail.  In Part II, I briefly summarize 
the retroactivity doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court in Teague and 
its progeny.  Part III analyzes the Supreme Court retroactivity doctrine as it 
applies to Padilla.  Part IV then summarizes the debate among lower courts 
as to whether Padilla applies retroactively and why.  In Part V, I present my 
argument that Padilla applies retroactively because the Court 
straightforwardly applied Strickland, a clearly-established rule that requires 
a case-by-case examination of the facts, and as a result, it did not announce 
a new rule. 
I.  The Padilla Decision 
A.  Facts and Lower Court History 
After police pulled over his tractor-trailer and discovered the one 
thousand pounds of marijuana he was carrying, Jose Padilla, a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States, considered pleading guilty to a 
charge of trafficking marijuana.51  His attorney advised that deportation 
would not result from the plea due to Padilla’s military service and forty 
years residing in the United States.52 
Padilla pleaded guilty and, contrary to the advice of his attorney, 
subsequently became the subject of deportation proceedings.53  The Court 
acknowledged that this result was virtually automatic because almost every 
drug offense creates a presumption of mandatory deportation.54  Padilla 
sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his attorney denied him effective 
assistance of counsel.55  The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied relief, 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477; see also Nina Totenberg, High Court:  Lawyers Must 
Give Immigration Advice, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125420249 (last visited Nov. 25, 
2011) (“[A]mong his registered cargo were 23 Styrofoam boxes containing a half-ton of 
marijuana.”)  (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 52. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 53. Id.; see also, Totenberg, supra note 51 (“The guilty plea triggered a mandatory 
deportation.”). 
 54. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 n.1 (“Padilla’s crime, like virtually every drug 
offense except for only the most insignificant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).”). 
 55. Id. at 1478 (citations omitted). 
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classifying deportation as a collateral consequence outside the scope of the 
Sixth Amendment.56  
B.  The United States Supreme Court Holding 
On March 31, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky 
Supreme Court and ruled that counsel must inform clients of the 
deportation risks of a guilty plea.57  Both affirmative misadvice and silence 
count as ineffective assistance of counsel after Padilla.58  Recognizing that 
immigration is a complex “legal specialty,” the Court limited its holding by 
requiring correct advice only when deportation consequences are clear but 
allowing mere advice of possible deportation risks when the applicable 
immigration law is unclear.59 
The Court held that Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally deficient, 
finding for Mr. Padilla on the first prong of Strickland and remanding on 
the issue of prejudice.60  The Court observed that under Strickland, “[t]he 
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms.”61  The Court then noted:  “The 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 1486–87 (finding that Mr. Padilla “sufficiently alleged that his counsel 
was constitutionally deficient” and reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky). 
 58. See id. at 1484 (rejecting a request to limit its holding to affirmative misadvice and 
finding that such a limit would invite the “absurd results” of attorneys remaining silent on 
“matters of great importance” and would deny clients “the most rudimentary advice on 
deportation even when it is readily available”). 
 59. See id., 130 S.Ct. at 1483 (acknowledging a limited duty of counsel in “situations 
where the deportation consequences of a guilty plea are unclear or uncertain”).  The Court 
continued: 
When the law is not succinct and straightforward, . . . a criminal defense 
attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal 
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.  But when the 
deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is 
equally clear. 
Id. 
 60. See id. at 1483–84 (“Padilla has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to 
satisfy the first prong of Strickland.”).  “Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim will 
depend on whether he can satisfy Strickland’s second prong, prejudice, a matter we leave to 
the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance.”  Id. 
 61. Id. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
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weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel 
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”62 
Central to the retroactivity issue (whether or not Padilla announced a 
new rule) is the fact that the Court had never before required counsel to 
advise of the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.63  Lower courts, 
including the Kentucky Supreme Court, had rules excluding collateral 
consequences from the scope of what the Sixth Amendment requires.64  
Notably, the Court acknowledged that it has “never applied a distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of 
constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under 
Strickland.”65  The Court concluded that the direct/collateral distinction 
remained unnecessary to Padilla “because of the unique nature of 
deportation.”66 
C.  The Reach and Impact of Padilla 
Justice Alito, writing also for Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in the 
result.67  Justice Alito wrote separately because he would have limited the 
holding to finding only that affirmative misadvice about deportation risks 
would rise to the level of constitutionally deficient counsel.68  Justice Alito 
found such a limitation to be more consistent with lower court precedent 
that required counsel only to advise clients regarding the direct 
consequences of a conviction.69 
Justice Stevens, in the majority opinion, countered that limiting the 
holding to affirmative misadvice invites “two absurd results”:  one, it 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. (citations omitted). 
 63. See id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring) (observing that the Padilla majority cites no 
case holding that an attorney must advise criminal defendants about the removal 
consequences of a guilty plea). 
 64. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 124–25 (noting that most jurisdictions do not require 
a defendant to be informed of collateral consequences regardless of severity). 
 65. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481. 
 66. See id. (“Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider 
in this case . . . .”). 
 67. Id. at 1487. 
 68. See id. (“I concur in the judgment because a criminal defense attorney fails to 
provide effective assistance of counsel within the meaning of [Strickland] if the attorney 
misleads a noncitizen client regarding the removal consequences of a conviction.”). 
 69. See id. (“Until today, the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal 
courts was that reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a client about 
the direct consequences of a criminal conviction.”). 
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incentivizes counsel to remain silent in order to avoid liability, even when 
the law is clear; and, two, it denies the defendants least able to represent 
themselves access to basic advice on deportation consequences, even when 
counsel could easily provide it.70  Justice Stevens stated for the Court that:  
“It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with 
available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so 
‘clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis.’”71 
The Court believed its decision would have only a minimal effect on 
existing convictions resulting from guilty pleas.72  The Court expressed this 
belief in the face of concerns about a flood of litigation threatening to 
undermine the finality of guilty pleas.73  The Court noted that it “confronted 
a similar ‘floodgates’ concern in [Hill v. Lockhart] but nevertheless applied 
Strickland [and] . . . [a] flood did not follow in that decision’s wake.”74  
Considering that “[f]or at least the past 15 years, professional norms have 
generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the 
deportation consequences of a client’s plea,” the Court presumed that 
attorneys have advised accordingly;75 thus, few defendants will have 
grounds to challenge their guilty pleas.76 
The Court further remarked that guilty pleas account for 95% of all 
criminal convictions while only accounting for 30% of habeas petitions 
filed.77  Additionally limiting Padilla’s impact is the increased risk 
defendants face when collaterally attacking a guilty plea.78  Because “those 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See id. at 1484 (“Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at 
odds with the critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of ‘the advantages and 
disadvantages of a plea agreement.’” (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 
(1995))). 
 71. Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (White, J., concurring)). 
 72. See id. at 1485 (“It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant 
effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains.”). 
 73. See id. (stating the concerns of the Solicitor General, the state of Kentucky, and 
amici). 
 74. Id. at 1484–85. 
 75.  Id. 
 76. See id. (presuming “counsel satisfied their obligation” and advised their clients 
competently (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). 
 77. See id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, 418 (31st ed. 2005) (Table 5.17), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1219 and VICTOR E. 
FLANGO, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
36–38 (1994), respectively). 
 78. See id. at 1485–86 (recounting Hill prejudice as a defendant’s preference for trial 
over pleading guilty). 
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who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain 
obtained as a result of the plea,” the Court noted that defendants who do so 
face a potentially “less favorable outcome.”79  Thus, while noting that it 
“must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the 
validity of guilty pleas,”80 the Court expressed its confidence in Padilla’s 
minimal effect because “practice has shown that pleas are [infrequently] the 
subject of collateral challenges . . . .”81 
While the above statements imply retroactive application of Padilla, 
the Court did not expressly address the issue.  As lower courts apply the 
decision, they continue to disagree as to whether Padilla does apply 
retroactively.82  The federal circuit courts that have addressed Padilla’s 
retroactivity have arrived at opposite conclusions.83 
II.  A Brief Review of Retroactivity 
The Supreme Court articulated the prevailing standard for retroactivity 
in the criminal procedure context in Teague v. Lane.84  While Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Teague announces the general rule for the 
Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine, the Court has continued to revisit 
and refine the doctrine—beginning the year after Teague was decided.85  
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. 
 80.  Id. at 1485. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“District courts have issued divergent opinions on the question of whether 
Padilla [applies retroactively].”) (citations omitted); United States v. Gutierrez Martinez, 
No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2010) (collecting cases). 
 83. Compare United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding 
Padilla applies retroactively) with Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 
2011) (holding Padilla announced a new rule that does not apply retroactively). 
 84. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (holding that “habeas corpus cannot be 
used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules 
would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two 
exceptions we have articulated”); see Doan v. United States, 760 F.Supp.2d 602, 605 (E.D. 
Va. 2011) (“[Retroactivity] analysis must begin with Teague.”); United States v. Chaidez, 
730 F.Supp.2d 896, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Teague as the “landmark decision” 
regarding retroactivity analysis); Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 343–44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2010) (explaining that Teague articulates the Supreme Court retroactivity doctrine and “the 
most manageable statement yet provided as to what constitutes a new [rule]”). 
 85. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412–14 (1990) (extrapolating the Teague 
definition of a new rule); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (explaining the definition 
and proper inquiries to ask in defining a new rule); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 227–28 
(1992) (allowing that a decision that does not announce a new rule might nonetheless create 
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This Section highlights the Court’s guidance for defining new rules as it has 
been developed post-Teague. 
In Teague, the Court determined that decisions creating a new 
constitutional rule of criminal procedure apply only prospectively; 
however, decisions applying an existing standard or test will apply 
retroactively.86  In other words, old rules apply to all cases (whether on 
direct or collateral review), but new rules only apply to cases not yet final 
on direct review.87 
The Court did carve out two narrow, and difficult to reach, exceptions 
where new rules of constitutional criminal procedure will apply 
retroactively.88  The first exception applies a new rule retroactively when 
the rule places “‘certain . . . conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe. . . .’”89  Rephrased, this exception allows 
retroactive application of new substantive law rather than new procedural 
law.90  The substantive exception requires retroactive application for rules 
that alter government authority to criminalize conduct or impose 
punishment.91 
The second exception permits retroactive application of “watershed 
rules of criminal procedure,” which are critical to the fundamental fairness 
and accuracy of the trial.92  The watershed exception applies only when a 
rule is necessary to prevent “an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate 
                                                                                                                 
a new rule “because the prior decision is applied in a novel setting”); Wright v. West, 505 
U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (“[Retroactivity] of an old rule in a novel setting . . . depends in large 
part on the nature of the rule.”).  “If [it] requires a case-by-case examination . . . then we can 
tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that those applications themselves 
create a new rule.”  Id. 
 86. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 316 (holding that new rules of constitutional procedure 
will not apply retroactively unless through one of the two articulated exceptions). 
 87. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (“Under the Teague 
framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is 
generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review.”). 
 88. See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004) (“Under our retroactivity analysis as 
set forth in [Teague], federal habeas corpus petitioners may not avail themselves of new 
rules of constitutional criminal procedure outside two narrow exceptions.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 89. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 
(1971)). 
 90. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) (defining the substantive rule 
exception to Teague). 
 91. See id. (“A rule is substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of 
conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.”). 
 92. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (requiring an exception for procedures that are 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (citations omitted). 
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conviction,” and the rule must “alter [] understanding of the bedrock 
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.”93  The Court 
has noted:  “[I]n the years since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a 
new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status.”94 
The key inquiry, then, in determining whether a decision applies 
retroactively is whether the decision announces a new rule or applies old 
law.95  In Teague, the Court acknowledged the inherent difficulty of 
defining new rules and offered as guidelines that a new rule “breaks new 
ground” or is “not dictated by precedent” or “imposes a new obligation on 
the government.”96  The Court has since provided further articulations to 
guide this determination, including this warning:  “In the vast majority of 
cases, . . . where the new decision is reached by an extension of the 
reasoning of previous cases, the inquiry will be . . . difficult.”97  The Court 
later clarified:  “The explicit overruling of an earlier holding no doubt 
creates a new rule; it is more difficult, however, to determine whether we 
announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior 
cases.”98 
Unfortunately, the Court concedes that difficulty remains in 
determining whether a case extending the reasoning of prior cases and 
overruling lower court precedent announces a new rule.99  To assist in the 
confusion, the Court indicated that applications of old rules to new 
contexts, when not dictated by precedent, might create a new rule.100  For 
example, the Court has found a new rule in the capital sentencing context 
where precedent supported a decision but did not mandate its extension 
from a focus on the sentencer to the individual jurors.101 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 416 (“Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct 
and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on 
direct review.”). 
 96. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (acknowledging difficulty in determining when a case 
announces a new rule). 
 97. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412–13 (1990). 
 98. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990). 
 99. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (“It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a 
case announces a new rule, and [it is difficult] to define the spectrum of what may or may 
not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes.”). 
 100. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992) (“[I]t is necessary to inquire 
whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is 
applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.”). 
 101. See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413–16 (2004) (“Thus, although the 
Lockett principle . . . could be thought to support the Mills rule . . . .  [Lockett] did not 
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However, the Court has also said:  “If the rule in question is one which 
of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we 
can tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that those 
applications themselves create a new rule. “102  Strickland is an example of 
such a rule.103  The Court has found that the Strickland test is “clearly 
established” precedent that does not break new ground or impose new 
obligations on States.104  According to the Court, “[Strickland] provides 
sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims.”105 
Perhaps one of the most relevant statements related to the Padilla 
retroactivity inquiry comes from Teague itself, where the Court said:  
“Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new 
rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded 
justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly 
situated.”106 
The Court recently ruled that State law governs State habeas corpus 
petitions, and that States are free to apply decisions retroactively even when 
the Supreme Court holds that a rule does not apply retroactively in the 
federal courts.107  And State procedural rules can present another hurdle.  
For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia recently ruled that defendants’ 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not constitute errors of 
fact sufficient to use certain State petitions for collateral relief.108  
Emphasizing the importance and impact of Padilla, one Virginia judge has 
refused to follow the Supreme Court of Virginia ruling, stating that 
                                                                                                                 
compel Mills . . . .  Accordingly, Mills announced a new rule . . . .”). 
 102. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy J., concurring). 
 103. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“[T]he Strickland test ‘of 
necessity requires a case-by-case examination . . . .’” (quoting Wright, 505 U.S. at 308)). 
 104. See id. (“[I]t can hardly be said that recognizing the right to effective counsel 
‘breaks new ground or imposes new a new obligation on the States.’” (quoting Teague, 489 
U.S. at 301)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. 
 107. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282 (2008) (“[Teague] limits the kinds 
of . . . relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court, 
when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is 
deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague.”). 
 108. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 705 S.E.2d 503, 508 (Va. 2011) (“[A] claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an error of fact for which coram vobis 
will lie under [Virginia] Code § 8.01-677.”). 
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constitutional rights would be violated if he did.109  However, these 
procedural concerns lie beyond the scope of this Note. 
The reader is not alone if confused on the retroactivity doctrine.  The 
split among the lower courts exemplifies the difficulty in applying the 
retroactivity doctrine to Supreme Court decisions. 110  This Note will 
provide a more detailed explanation of the different lower court approaches 
in Part IV. 
III.  Applying the Retroactivity Doctrine to Padilla 
To determine retroactivity, the Supreme Court has given this guidance: 
Under Teague, the determination whether a constitutional rule of 
criminal procedure applies to a case on collateral review involves a 
three-step process . . . .  First, the court must determine when the 
defendant’s conviction became final.  Second, . . . the court must decide 
whether the rule is actually ‘new.’  Finally, if the rule is new, the court 
must consider whether it falls within either of the two exceptions to 
nonretroactivity.111 
In order to be a new rule, Padilla would have to “impose a new 
obligation” on government, “break new ground” or otherwise not be 
“dictated by precedent.”112  Additionally, Padilla could create a new rule if 
the decision represents an unpredictable extension of precedent into a new 
factual context.113  However, if in Padilla, the Court merely applied clearly 
established law, or if it applied a rule requiring a case-by-case factual 
examination, then the decision will apply retroactively even if it represents 
an extension of precedent.114 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See Tom Jackman, Loudon Judge Defies Va. Supreme Court, Continues to Reopen 
Immigrants’ Cases, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/loudoun-judge-defies-va-supreme-court-continues-to-reopen-immigrants-
cases/2011/02/06/AB3BovQ_story.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (describing how a judge 
defied a Virginia Supreme Court ruling) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 110. See United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (D. Neb. 
Nov. 9, 2010) (citing courts coming to opposite conclusions as to Padilla retroactivity). 
 111. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 (2004). 
 112. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (providing general guidelines as to what constitutes a 
new rule). 
 113. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992) (“[I]t is necessary to inquire 
whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is 
applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.”). 
 114. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
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A.  Straightforward Strickland 
In Padilla, the Court made this much clear:  “Strickland applies to 
Padilla’s claim.”115  After commenting that a direct/collateral consequences 
distinction remains unnecessary to Strickland analyses, the Court justified 
including deportation within the scope of the Sixth Amendment.116  
Because it is a “severe penalty” that is “nearly an automatic result” from its 
“intimate[] relat[ion] to the criminal process,” the Court concluded that 
“advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”117 
In Part III of the majority opinion, the Court analyzed the case under 
the first prong of Strickland and found that Mr. Padilla received 
constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel.118  The Court reaffirmed 
that “[p]revailing norms of practice” guide the question of “whether 
counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.’”119  Citing multiple sources, the Court concluded:  “The 
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel 
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”120  And the Court 
recounted its previously stated expectation that counsel would “follow the 
advice of [those] practice guides,” especially given the Court’s past 
recognition that noncitizen defendants might prefer jail to deportation.121  In 
fact, the Court has previously acknowledged that the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice have advised informing defendants of immigration 
consequences since 1982.122 
                                                                                                                 
(explaining that Strickland represents “‘clearly established Federal law’” that “‘requires a 
case-by-case factual examination of the evidence’” and applies retroactively because it 
neither breaks new ground nor imposes new obligations on the States (quoting Wright v. 
West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992))); Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (discussing how to determine 
when a case announces a new rule). 
 115. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
 116. See id. at 1481–82 (including deportation within the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment because it is “uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or collateral 
consequence”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. at 1482–83 (reviewing Mr. Padilla’s claim to see if his counsel’s 
performance “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’” (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688)). 
 119. Id. at 1482. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 1483 (noting the Court’s previous statements regarding counsel’s 
responsibilities to noncitizen clients (citing I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001))). 
 122. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) (“[T]he American Bar 
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The Court remanded the case to allow Mr. Padilla an attempt to show 
prejudice under Strickland’s second prong.123  But the Court warned:  
“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.”124  Thus, it is 
clear that Strickland disposed of Mr. Padilla’s claim. 
The briefs before the Court in Padilla raised the concern that ruling 
Mr. Padilla’s counsel constitutionally deficient would open the floodgates 
and undermine the finality of numerous guilty pleas.125  Such worries imply 
that the Court’s ruling might be “breaking new ground” and leading to new 
litigation.  However, the Court dismissed these concerns, presuming that 
most defendants facing the risk of deportation receive effective assistance 
from their counsel.126 
The Court highlighted how similar concerns had proved unfounded 
after its decision in Hill v. Lockhart.127  And the same principles stemming 
the flood after Hill apply to Padilla, the Court reasoned, because Strickland 
requires a defendant to “convince the court that a decision to reject the plea 
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”128  The Court 
then added what seems like an unambiguous statement that it expected its 
decision to apply retroactively when it said:  “It seems unlikely that our 
decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already 
obtained as the result of plea bargains.”129  If Padilla applied only 
prospectively, then there would be no effect on “convictions already 
obtained.” 
                                                                                                                 
Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice provide that, if a defendant will face 
deportation as a result of a conviction, defense counsel ‘should fully advise the defendant of 
these consequences.’” (citing 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 14-3.2 Comment, 75 
(2d ed. 1982))). 
 123. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483–84 (“Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his 
claim will depend on whether he can satisfy Strickland’s second prong, prejudice, a matter 
we leave to the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance.”). 
 124. Id. at 1485. 
 125. See id. at 1484 (“We have given serious consideration to the concerns that the 
Solicitor General, respondent, and amici have stressed regarding the importance of 
protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty pleas.”). 
 126. See id. at 1485 (“For at least the past 15 years, professional norms have generally 
imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a 
client’s plea . . . . ”).  “We . . . presume that counsel satisfied their obligation . . . .”  Id. 
 127. See id. at 1484–85 (“We confronted a similar ‘floodgates’ concern in Hill . . . but 
nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client 
regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty.”).  “A flood did not follow in that 
decision’s wake.”  Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (emphasis added). 
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B.  Breaking New Ground 
The argument that Padilla announced a new rule hinges on the finding 
that a noncitizen defendant facing the risk of deportation is entitled to the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.130  The 
Court rejected the lower courts’ distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences for the purposes of defining the scope of the entitlement to 
effective assistance of counsel.131  However, Padilla does offer a novel 
articulation of effective assistance of counsel—never before had the Court 
required advice beyond the direct consequences of a plea agreement.132 
Some, including Justice Scalia, argue that Padilla opened the door to 
ineffective assistance claims for other collateral consequences.133  These 
arguments assert that the Court “br[oke] new ground” in that Padilla was 
not “dictated by precedent.”134  Based on this reasoning, some lower courts 
have ruled that Padilla did announce a new rule and so does not apply 
retroactively.135 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 344–46 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (relying on 
lower court precedent to argue that the Court announced a new rule extending the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to cover advice regarding the deportation consequences of a 
criminal conviction); see also United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at 
*2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010) (finding Padilla announced a new rule because “failure to inform 
a defendant of the prospect of deportation” was not required by Eighth Circuit precedent). 
 131. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (finding unnecessary the direct/collateral 
consequences distinction applied by the Kentucky Supreme Court and other lower courts). 
 132. See Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment:  A Critical Guide to 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (2010) (“It is the first time the Court has extended 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to a consequence of conviction that is not part of the 
court-imposed punishment.”). 
 133. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Adding to counsel’s duties 
an obligation to advise about a conviction’s collateral consequences has no logical stopping 
point.”); Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 24 (“Deportation is but one of a broad range of 
rights and privileges that may be affected by criminal conviction . . . .”).  “At least in some 
cases, these consequences will share the characteristics the Court recognized as important in 
Padilla . . . .”  Id. 
 134. See Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“[Some] district courts . . . have held that Padilla did announce a ‘new 
constitutional rule,’ stressing that the result in Padilla was not dictated by 
precedent . . . [and] have further held that Padilla should not be considered retroactive for 
this very reason.”). 
 135. See Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010) 
(“Thus, this Court is convinced that Padilla created a ‘new rule’ that should not apply 
retroactively.”); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1, 2010 WL 4134286, at 
*3 (D. N.J. Oct. 19, 2010) (“Thus, the 2010 Padilla decision requiring counsel to advise a 
non-citizen client of deportation consequences is a new constitutional rule and should not be 
applied retroactively . . . .”). 
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Of course, courts have long applied the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel to collateral consequences to some degree.136  
Rather than limiting the right to counsel to direct consequences, courts have 
instead held that when applied to collateral consequences, the standard of 
care only requires avoiding affirmative misadvice.137  A few courts have 
even preceded the Supreme Court in requiring counsel to correctly advise 
on serious collateral consequences including deportation and sexual 
offender registration.138 
Justice Alito argued in his concurrence that the Court should limit its 
holding to require counsel to avoid affirmative misadvice and to at least 
advise noncitizen defendants that pleading guilty “may have adverse 
immigration consequences.”139  Importantly, though, Justice Alito did see 
Padilla as “falling within the [scope] of Strickland,” as he makes clear in 
Part II of his opinion.140  Justice Alito agreed with the majority that the 
Sixth Amendment extends to require at least some advice about deportation 
consequences, but he argued that the Court should only require advice of 
the possibility of deportation.141  While his concurrence implies that 
Strickland straightforwardly governed Padilla, Justice Alito did call the 
holding a “dramatic expansion” and a “major upheaval in Sixth 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and 
the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 708–09 (2002) (listing the 
varying degrees to which lower courts require advice about collateral consequences). 
 137. See Leading Case:  Criminal Law and Procedure—Sixth Amendment—Effective 
Assistance of Counsel:  Padilla v. Kentucky, 124 HARV. L. REV. 199, 205–06 (2010) 
(explaining the approach “widely adopted by the lower courts” that Strickland applies to 
collateral consequences at least to the degree of avoiding affirmative misadvice). 
 138. See Proctor & King, supra note 35, at 239 (“[T]hree state courts had interpreted 
the Sixth Amendment to impose a duty on counsel to provide advise [sic] about the risks of 
deportation to clients who are pleading guilty.”); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide 
Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  Involuntary 
Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 697–98 (2008) 
(discussing the New Mexico Supreme Court’s holding that counsel must correctly advise 
noncitizen defendants about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea). 
 139. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating, “in [his] view,” an 
attorney’s requirements). 
 140. See id. at 1487, 1492–94 (applying Strickland to reach the same result as the 
majority but arguing that the holding, under Strickland, should only require attorneys to 
avoid affirmative misadvice and to at least warn noncitizen defendants of the possibility of 
adverse immigration consequences). 
 141. See id. at 1494 (“I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more 
than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation . . . . ”).  “[T]he attorney should advise 
the client that a criminal conviction may have adverse [immigration] consequences . . . and 
that the client should consult an immigration specialist . . . .”  Id. 
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Amendment law,” noting that the holding was contrary to every lower 
federal court.142 
Some lower courts have found that Padilla created a new rule based on 
Justice Alito’s comments regarding the impact on lower court precedent.143  
However, other courts have ruled that, in Padilla, the Court merely applied 
its clearly established Strickland doctrine.144 
C.  So Which Is It? 
So far, lower courts disagree on whether Padilla announced a new rule 
or applied its existing Strickland test to the facts of the case.145  No court 
has found Padilla to be a new rule that falls within one of the two 
exceptions to nonretroactivity, though some have argued that Padilla meets 
the requirements to be a watershed case. 146  However, given the Court’s 
prior language, it seems unlikely that Padilla would fall under the 
“watershed” exception.147  Then there are some courts that have avoided the 
retroactivity question altogether.148  The next Section explores the opposing 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See id. at 1492 (arguing that the majority “casually dismisses the longstanding and 
unanimous position of the lower federal courts with respect to the scope of criminal defense 
counsel’s duty to advise on collateral consequences”). 
 143. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 348 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“Justice Alito 
repeatedly referred to the majority opinion as one that was breaking new ground.”). 
 144. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D. 
Cal. July 1, 2010) (“[T]his Court concludes that Padilla’s application of Strickland’s well-
established test for determining whether counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable 
did not produce a novel result and, therefore, did not announce a new rule . . . .”). 
 145. See Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 923–25 (Md. 2011) (collecting cases that 
reach different conclusions on Padilla’s retroactivity); United States v. Gutierrez Martinez, 
No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2010) (“Courts that have 
considered the question of Padilla’s retroactive application have reached conflicting 
results.”). 
 146. See Gutierrez Martinez, No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490 at *2–3 (listing cases 
and their various holdings on Padilla retroactivity but not listing any finding Padilla to fall 
within Teague’s two exceptions to nonretroactivity for new rules); John L. Holahan & 
Shauna Faye Kieffer, Effective Assistance of Counsel Where Pleas Mandate Deportation, 
BENCH & BAR OF MINN. (Aug. 10, 2010), available at 
http://mnbenchbar.com/2010/08/padilla-motions/ (“[I]t appears that the Padilla decision is a 
watershed rule of fundamental fairness, and should be applied retroactively.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 147. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 407–08 (2007) (“Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 [1963] . . . [is] the only case that this Court has identified as qualifying under 
[the watershed] exception . . . .”). 
 148. See Gutierrez Martinez, 2010 WL 5266490, at *3 (“In light of the confusion 
engendered by Padilla, several courts have bypassed the question of retroactivity 
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approaches taken by lower courts in deciding whether Padilla announced a 
new rule. 
IV.  Lower Court Reaction 
Recall the defendants from the Introduction.  Their disparate treatment 
exists for two reasons.  One arises from disagreement over Padilla’s 
impact.149  Some courts have concluded that Padilla merely articulated 
clearly established law that applies to guilty pleas entered before and after 
the Court’s decision.150  Other courts, however, have ruled that Padilla 
broke new ground and announced a new rule that only applies prospectively 
to guilty pleas entered after the decision.151 
The second reason for the discrepancy springs from the rationale of 
Padilla.  Even though the Court expressly limited its holding to noncitizens 
facing deportation,152 the dissent and commentators have argued that its 
logic easily extends to all collateral consequences, such as civil 
commitment, loss of voting rights, inability to carry firearms, and loss of 
professional licenses.153 
Many seeking post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of 
counsel must guess whether the court in which they file their petition will 
apply Padilla retroactively and whether or not the court will restrict Padilla 
to the immigration context or extend it to all unique and severe collateral 
consequences.  In the following Sections, this Note will show, through the 
                                                                                                                 
where . . . the petitioner was not prejudiced.”). 
 149. See id. at *2 (“Courts that have considered the question of Padilla’s retroactive 
application have reached conflicting results.”). 
 150. See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 637–41 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that 
Padilla logically followed from the clearly established law of Strickland and Hill); United 
States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) 
(“[T]his Court concludes that Padilla’s application of Strickland’s well-established test for 
determining whether counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable did not produce a 
novel result and, therefore, did not announce a new rule . . . .”). 
 151. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) 
(concluding that Padilla announced a new rule); Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 347 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2010) (“Justice Alito repeatedly referred to the majority opinion as one that was 
breaking new ground.”). 
 152. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (labeling deportation as “uniquely difficult to 
classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence”). 
 153. See id. at 1496 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing that extending the Strickland 
doctrine to deportation has “no logical stopping point”); Leading Case, supra note 137, at 
206–08 (suggesting that other collateral consequences meet “the Padilla test,” thus 
warranting similar treatment). 
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lower courts’ analysis, that the Court applied Strickland to decide Padilla.  
Under the Court’s language in analyzing retroactivity, Padilla did not 
create a new rule. 
A.  Arguments for Retroactivity 
In U.S. v. Chaidez,154 the Northern District of Illinois framed the 
retroactivity issue as whether Padilla announced a categorical rule that 
counsel must advise defendants of immigration consequences or an 
application of Strickland to a case where the attorney factually fell below 
professional norms at the time of the guilty plea.155  Ultimately, the court 
decided that Padilla applies retroactively because the Supreme Court 
merely applied Strickland, which provides guidance for “virtually all 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.”156 
The court observed that lower courts have been split on the 
retroactivity issue and then determined Padilla did not announce a new rule 
for two reasons.157  First, the court concluded that the Supreme Court, by 
not addressing retroactivity as a threshold question in Padilla, indicated its 
understanding that the decision did not announce a new rule.158  Secondly, 
the court stated that retroactively applying the Padilla decision achieves  
Teague’s goal of promoting finality of judgments while allowing for review 
of constitutional errors.159 
The Chaidez court restated the Teague rule that a new rule is 
announced when the Supreme Court overturns its own precedent.160  
However, it also cited a subsequent Supreme Court decision that 
                                                                                                                 
 154.  See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding 
that Padilla applied retroactively). 
 155. See id. at 901 (“Padilla could be described as establishing a per se rule that 
counsel must inform a client of immigration consequences before an informed guilty plea 
may be entered.”).  “Alternatively, the case can be read as a straightforward application of 
Strickland.”)  Id. 
 156. See id. at 902 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)). 
 157. See id. at 899, 902 (“[T]he court is convinced that Padilla did not announce a new 
rule for two reasons.”). 
 158. See id. at 902–03 (describing the principles behind Teague retroactivity and 
finding that none of the three opinions in Padilla addressed the issue, apparently with the 
understanding that it would apply retroactively). 
 159. See id. at 903–04 (stating that the flexibility of the Strickland test allows for both 
the review of constitutional errors and protecting the finality of convictions). 
 160. See id. at 899 (“When the Court overturns its own prior precedent, clearly a new 
rule is established.” (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990))). 
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acknowledged the difficulty of defining a new rule when the Supreme 
Court extends its precedent to a new factual context.161  Indeed, as the court 
correctly observed, in cases where the Supreme Court has found a decision 
to be dictated by precedent, the Court lacked unanimity as to that result.162 
Addressing the overwhelming contrary precedent, the court recalled 
the Supreme Court’s observation that “the mere existence of conflicting 
authority does not mean a rule is new.”163  The court added that, according 
to Justice Kennedy, whether a rule is new or is an old rule applied in a new 
context “depends in large part on the nature of the rule.”164  Justice 
Kennedy has explained that a rule of general application (i.e. one requiring 
case-by-case factual examination) will lead to the Court tolerating “a 
number of specific applications without saying that those applications 
themselves create a new rule.”165  In the same regard, the court noted that 
Strickland cases rarely yield new rules.166  Strickland, by its terms, requires 
a case-by-case examination of the facts.167  In fact, the Supreme Court has 
applied prevailing professional norms to new factual contexts repeatedly 
without deeming those decisions new rules.168 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See id. at 899–900 (“‘[I]t is more difficult, however, to determine whether [the 
Court] announces a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of [its] prior cases.’” 
(quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990))). 
 162. See id. at 900 (“In [Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318–19 (1989)] and [Stringer 
v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992)], the Court determined that the results were ‘dictated’ by 
[precedent].  Yet, neither of these decisions was unanimous.”). 
 163. Id. at 901 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)). 
 164. See id. at 902 (“Whether the prisoner seeks application of an old rule in a novel 
setting, depends in large part on the nature of the rule.” (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 
277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 165. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(explaining the Teague requirements of a new rule). 
 166. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp.2d 896, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[T]he 
only question for this court is whether [Padilla] is ‘the infrequent [Strickland] case that 
yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule.’” (quoting Osagiede v. United States, 543 
F.3d 399, 408 n.4 (7th Cir. 2008))). 
 167. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (labeling Strickland as 
established law that “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence” and 
observing that Strickland is a clear rule that does not “break new ground” when it is 
applied). 
 168. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D. 
Cal. July 1, 2010) (“The Supreme Court has issued a number of relatively recent opinions 
applying the Strickland test in a variety of different factual contexts; none of these cases has 
been afforded new rule status under Teague.” (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 
(2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 
(2000))). 
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Chaidez observed that a critical element of a Strickland analysis is the 
professional standards in use at the time the conviction becomes final.169 
The court observed that the Supreme Court has for nearly 10 years 
recognized deportation as a significant consequence of conviction and that 
professional standards advise counsel to inform their clients of immigration 
consequences to guilty pleas.170  And, as stated above, the Supreme Court 
has found professional norms to require as much dating back to 1982.171 
Additionally, Chaidez noted that if the Supreme Court did not 
anticipate retroactivity, then its dismissal of the floodgates concern would 
be unnecessary because the inquiry into ineffective assistance of counsel is 
by its nature retroactive.172  Accordingly, the court remanded the case to 
allow Ms. Chaidez to make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.173  
On a subsequent hearing, the same court granted Ms. Chaidez relief based 
on Padilla.174 
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Orocio, recently concluded that 
“[t]he application of Strickland to the Padilla scenario is not so removed 
from the broader outlines of precedent as to constitute a ‘new rule.’”  175  
The unanimous court found that Padilla “reaffirmed” the Strickland 
principles that guide defense counsel’s obligations to the defendant during 
guilty pleas.176  Additionally, the Third Circuit concluded that Padilla did 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See Chaidez, 730 F.Supp.2d at 903 (“A post-conviction court applying Strickland 
is bound to consider whether counsel’s assistance was effective with relevance to 
professional standards as they existed at the time of conviction.” (citing Conner v. McBride, 
375 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2004))). 
 170. See id. at 903 (“The Supreme Court, itself, recognized as early as 2001 that 
immigration consequences of guilty pleas would be critically important to defendants and 
that ‘competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides’ would 
be expected to advise clients [accordingly].” (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 & 
n.50 (2001))). 
 171. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) (citing the 1982 edition of the 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice for the practice guideline that counsel “should fully 
advise the defendant of [deportation] consequences”). 
 172. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp.2d 896, 903–04 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (adding 
that the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry requires collateral review because few 
defendants who plead guilty have grounds or desire for direct appeal). 
 173. See id. at 905 (“Now that Chaidez has established a legally sufficient claim for 
relief, she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.”). 
 174. See United States v. Chaidez, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3–4 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 6, 2010) (vacating the conviction because counsel failed to warn Chaidez that a 
guilty plea carried immigration consequences). 
 175. United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 638 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 176. See id. (“Far from extending the Strickland rule into uncharted territory, Padilla 
reaffirmed defense counsel’s obligations to the criminal defendant during the plea 
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not “break new ground” because Padilla straightforwardly applied 
Strickland by analyzing long-established professional norms.177  Finally, the 
court pointed to the floodgates discussion as indication that the Supreme 
Court anticipated Padilla applying retroactively.178 
Other courts agree with various aspects of the Orocio and Chaidez 
reasoning.179  Some focus on the Supreme Court recognition that Strickland 
often applies to new factual contexts but rarely—if ever—creates new 
rules.180  Additionally, courts agree that the Supreme Court anticipated 
retroactive application as indicated by its language dismissing the 
floodgates concerns.181  Other courts hinge the retroactivity issue on the 
Court’s emphasis on prevailing professional norms.182 
  Similar analysis led prominent scholars to agree that Padilla applies 
retroactively.183  In addition to the reasoning above, the commentators 
suggested that the Supreme Court indicated that creating a direct/collateral 
consequences distinction would be a substitution for the well-established 
Strickland standard.184  Additionally, the scholars point out that the 
Supreme Court not only expected Padilla to apply retroactively but also 
that it would affect the finality of only a minimal number of convictions.185  
The Court based this expectation on two presumptions:  that counsel will 
                                                                                                                 
process.”). 
 177. See id. (observing that the Supreme Court analyzed Padilla according to prevailing 
professional norms in spite of contrary lower court rulings). 
 178. See id. (“[C]lose scrutiny of the Padilla opinion leads us to consider it not unlikely 
that the Padilla Court anticipated the retroactive application of its holding on collateral 
review when it considered the effect its decision would have on final convictions.”). 
 179. See Proctor & King, supra note 35, at 240 n.30 (collecting cases that find Padilla 
applies retroactively). 
 180. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5 (E.D. 
Cal. July 1, 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has applied Strickland in numerous new 
contexts without finding those decisions to be new rules (citing Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 
1162, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008))). 
 181. See id. at *7 (“If the Court intended Padilla to be a new rule which would apply 
only prospectively, the entire ‘floodgates’ discussion would have been unnecessary.”). 
 182. See Martin v. United States, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 3463949, at *3  (C.D. Ill. 
Aug. 25, 2010) (finding that Padilla did not break new ground because the Supreme Court 
based its decision on prevailing professional norms and applied Strickland). 
 183. See Proctor & King, supra note 35, at 240–41 (concluding that Padilla is not a 
new rule and, like other Strickland decisions, applies retroactively). 
 184. See id. at 240 (calling such a distinction an ineffective “shorthand” or 
“alternative”). 
 185. See id. at 240–41 (“Without a mention of Teague, the Court explained that its 
decision would not likely affect the finality of most convictions.”). 
WHAT’S NEW IS OLD AGAIN 121 
have adhered to prevailing professional norms and that few defendants will 
risk forfeiting the advantages of their plea agreements.186 
B.  Arguments Against Retroactivity 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, acting in its capacity as a 
retroactivity sommelier, recently addressed the task of determining 
“whether [Padilla] represents simply the decanting of old wine in new 
bottles or the uncorking of a new wine.”187  After restating the holding in 
Padilla, the court continued:  “The taste test now before us asks us to assess 
the vintage of [Padilla].  Will it or will it not date back to invalidate a guilty 
plea entered [before Padilla]?”188 
Notably, the petitioner, Mr. Miller, filed for relief prior to Padilla, so 
at least initially he was not trying to take advantage of a new Supreme 
Court ruling.189  The trial court judge hearing the coram nobis petition 
denied it by concluding that deportation was not a direct consequence of the 
plea.190  After Padilla, Mr. Miller appealed that decision, arguing that his 
petition’s denial was now “untenable.”191 
The Court of Special Appeals began with the keystone to its analysis 
by noting that the denial was based upon the “well-settled Maryland (and, 
indeed, national) law” that relied on the collateral/direct distinction and 
only allowed guilty plea attacks when defendants were denied advice as to 
the direct consequences.192  Despite Padilla’s language to the contrary, the 
Miller court labeled the collateral/direct consequences distinction 
“critical.”193  The court further noted the Maryland precedent accorded with 
                                                                                                                 
 186. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (presuming that counsel have adhered to 
professional norms and explaining that defendants who collaterally attack their pleas “lose 
the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea”). 
 187. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (framing the issue 
of Padilla retroactivity). 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. (stating Mr. Miller filed his coram nobis petition June 18, 2009 and the 
Supreme Court announced Padilla March 31, 2010). 
 190. See id. at 341–42 (concluding that deportation was only a collateral and not a 
direct consequence of his conviction). 
 191. Id. at 342. 
 192. See id. at 342 (“[A] guilty plea may not be attacked on the ground that the 
defendant had not been advised with respect to the collateral consequences (as opposed to 
direct consequences) of the conviction.”). 
 193. See id. at 351 (citing Maryland case law on the “critical distinction between a 
direct consequence of conviction and a collateral consequence”). 
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the federal circuits but was contrary to Padilla.194  In the face of what it 
labeled a “monolith of preexisting law” holding the opposite, the court 
found it unreasonable to consider Padilla an application of well-settled 
law.195  Instead, the court cited Justice Alito’s concurrence that the majority 
opinion marked a “dramatic departure” from “longstanding and unanimous” 
precedent in the federal courts and was “squarely athwart the well-worn and 
familiar path.”196  Labeling Padilla a new rule, the court decided against 
relief for Mr. Miller, whose conviction was “long beyond direct review.”197 
Indeed, most courts that find Padilla to be a new rule refer to the fact 
that eleven federal circuits and thirty states did not require attorneys to 
advise defendants of collateral consequences to their guilty pleas.198  
However, as Mr. Miller argued and the Court of Special Appeals observed, 
distinguishing between collateral and direct consequences is now 
inappropriate.199 
Analyzing the Teague doctrine, the Miller court found it “clear” that 
Padilla announced a new rule in that it “overruled a longstanding practice 
that lower courts had uniformly approved.”200  Believing it an important 
difference, the court distinguished that Padilla was not prohibited by 
Supreme Court precedent but concluded that it was not dictated by 
precedent.201  According to the court, the only “antecedent rumbling” 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See id. (“Just as did the federal circuit courts of appeal, Maryland consistently held 
that deportation was a collateral consequence of conviction . . . .”). 
 195. See id. (“[I]t is unreasonable, therefore, to say that [Padilla] did nothing but apply 
predictable and well-settled law.”). 
 196. See id. at 347 (“The concurring opinion in [Padilla] was more introspective than 
was the majority opinion.”). 
 197. See  id.  at 352 (“Accordingly, [Padilla] will not apply retroactively [to the case] 
now before us.”). 
 198. See Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“Other district courts . . . have held that Padilla did announce a [new rule], 
stressing that the result in Padilla was not dictated by precedent in the majority of federal 
courts . . . .”). 
 199. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 343 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“The appellant is 
correct that automatically rejecting a defendant’s claim on the basis of the collateral 
consequence-direct consequence distinction is no longer proper.”). 
 200. See id. at 344–45 (applying Teague to Padilla and concluding the decision was not 
dictated by precedent). 
 201. See id. at 345 (“[The Court was] free to go either way.  That by no means implies 
that the Court’s decision was one ‘dictated by precedent.’  It was simply not prohibited by its 
own precedent.”). 
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possibly predicting the Padilla decision came down after Mr. Miller’s 
guilty plea and so offered him no relief.202 
The court also accorded retroactivity weight to the Supreme Court’s 
description of the dramatic change in immigration law over the past ninety 
years.203  The implication, observed the court, was that the law must change 
in order to accommodate the changed law.204  According to the Special 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
prevailing professional norms was a “classic argumentative technique” to 
justify changing the law to what the Court thought it ought to be.205  The 
court then observed that it is irrelevant whether the Padilla majority 
thought it announced a new rule.206  Instead, the court took it upon itself to 
objectively measure whether Padilla did in fact change the law.207 
The Seventh Circuit applied similarly arduous reasoning when it 
reversed Chaidez.  The majority acknowledged that the Supreme Court 
expressly applied Strickland to Padilla, but concluded Padilla announced a 
new rule because lower courts had held otherwise.208  So much contrary 
lower court precedent suggests a new rule, according to the court, because 
most lower courts were not unreasonable in holding contrary to Padilla 
prior to its announcement.209  The majority “remain[ed] persuaded by the 
weight of lower court authority.”210  Similarly, the court reasoned that 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See id. at 346 (“Even as of that first fleeting hint of something ‘blowin’ in the 
wind,’ the time had already long since lapsed for any direct review of the appellant’s guilty 
plea of June 1, 1999.”). 
 203. See id. at 345–46 (stating that the Court from the outset was “responding to a 
dramatically changing situation”). 
 204. See id. at 346 (“The implication was unmistakable that the law providing some 
relief to non-citizens, far from remaining static, would have to change to meet the changing 
needs of changing times, to wit, the ‘dramatic rais[ing of] the stakes.’” (quoting Padilla, 130 
S. Ct. at 1480)). 
 205. See id. at 346–47 (“The Supreme Court was unquestionably justifying the change 
it was about to make.”).  “That, by definition, is making new law.”  Id. 
 206. See id. at 347 (“Our search internally for Freudian clues as to what [Padilla] 
thought about itself, however, is very secondary.”). 
 207. See id. (“What ultimately matters is not whether the Supreme Court majority 
subjectively thought it was changing the law, but whether, as an objectively measured fact, it 
did change the law.”). 
 208. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Our conclusion 
that Padilla announced a new rule finds additional support in pre-Padilla decisions by state 
and federal courts.”). 
 209. See id. at 692 (referring to the “large majority of federal and state courts” not 
requiring counsel to advise defendants of immigration consequences of guilty pleas in the 
absence of Supreme Court precedent). 
 210. Id. 
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because Padilla includes concurring and dissenting opinions, the rule must 
not have been dictated by precedent and so must be new.211 
Conceding that Padilla represents an extension of Strickland, the 
majority stated that such an extension is an old rule only when it is “the sole 
reasonable interpretation of existing precedent.”212  The court went on to 
concede that any extension of Strickland will rarely be a new rule and then 
decided that Padilla was an example of that rare exception.213  The court 
wondered, “[I]f Padilla is considered an old rule, it is hard to imagine an 
application of Strickland that would qualify as a new rule.”214  With that 
statement, the majority essentially paraphrased Justice Kennedy’s 
observation that in applying Strickland, “it will be the infrequent case that 
yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule.”215  Yet, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that a direct application of Strickland, guided by long-
established professional norms, must be that infrequent case.216  For the 
majority, a reversal of lower court precedent carried more weight than the 
professional norms that guide Strickland analyses. 
As the dissent observed:  “The existence of concurring and dissenting 
views does not alter the fact that the prevailing professional norms at the 
time of Chaidez’s plea required a lawyer to advise her of the immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea.”217  The dissent further noted that the 
concurring Justices in Padilla both agreed that Strickland requires attorneys 
to at least advise that pleading guilty may have adverse immigration 
consequences.218  The Third Circuit put it well:  “It [is] ‘hardly novel’ for 
counsel to provide advice to defendants at the plea stage concerning the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.”219 
                                                                                                                 
 211. See id. at 689 (“That the members of the Padilla Court expressed such an ‘array of 
views’ indicates that Padilla was not dictated by precedent.” (citing O’Dell v. Netherland, 
521 U.S. 151, 159 (1997))). 
 212. See id. at 692 (reasoning that the fact that Padilla applies Strickland is not 
conclusive on whether Padilla announced a new rule). 
 213. See id. at 692 (“We recognize the application of Strickland to unique facts will 
generally not produce a new rule . . . .”).  “We believe Padilla to be the rare exception.”  Id.  
 214. Id. 
 215. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 216. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, at 692–93 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We 
believe Padilla to be the rare exception.”). 
 217. Id. at 696 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 218. See id. (referring to Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, which also conflicted with 
lower court precedent). 
 219. United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011) 
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Notably, the Seventh Circuit ignored—and the Miller court addressed 
only in a footnote220—the Supreme Court’s observation that:  “It seems 
unlikely that our decision today will have significant effect on those 
convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains.”221  Clearly, the 
Court anticipated some effect on convictions that preceded the Padilla 
announcement. 
In finding Padilla created a new rule, the Tenth Circuit advanced 
similar arguments regarding lower court precedent and Padilla’s concurring 
and dissenting opinions.222  The Tenth Circuit did acknowledge that Padilla 
did not overturn Supreme Court precedent and that the Court had nearly ten 
years prior recognized the importance of considering the deportation risk 
associated with guilty pleas.223  And the court conceded, “Without doubt, 
Padilla is a Strickland case.”224  Still, the court concluded Padilla 
announced a new rule because “[w]hile the Supreme Court had never 
foreclosed the application of Strickland to collateral consequences of a 
conviction, it had never applied Strickland to them either.”225 
Lower courts mirror the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland and the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in that most courts finding 
against retroactivity have focused on the precedent issue.226  The courts 
make two precedent arguments:  one argues that existing precedent in either 
the relevant circuit or State held the opposite of Padilla and so Padilla 
overturned uniform law, and the second argument claims that the lack of 
Supreme Court precedent meant that the announcement of Padilla created 
new law.227 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 347 n.5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (finding the 
two “nisi prius opinions relied on by the appellant” to be “singularly unpersuasive” in that 
they relied on the apparent belief of the Court that Padilla would be fully retroactive). 
 221. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (emphasis added). 
 222. See United States v. Chang Hong, ___F.3d___, 2011 WL 3805763, at *6 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (identifying lower court precedents contrary to Padilla and observing Justice 
Alito’s concurrence and Justice Scalia’s dissent). 
 223. See id. at *7 (summarizing counter-arguments that Padilla is not a new rule). 
 224. Id. at *5. 
 225. Id. at *7. 
 226. See Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“Other district courts . . . have held that Padilla did announce a [new rule], 
stressing that the result in Padilla was not dictated by precedent in the majority of the federal 
courts.”). 
 227. See United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *3 (D. Neb. 
Nov. 9, 2010) (finding against retroactivity because neither Supreme Court nor the Eighth 
Circuit precedent required advising defendants of immigration consequences prior to 
Padilla); see also United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1, 2010 WL 4134286, 
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Also, like Miller, some courts have argued that the only hint at the 
Padilla decision was 2001 dicta that in no way dictated the ultimate result 
of Padilla.228  One court concluded it was “unlikely” that the defendant 
could show that prevailing professional norms counseled attorneys to 
advise defendants of possible immigration consequences at the time the 
defendant’s conviction became final.229  Notably, in that case the conviction 
became final in 1997, and in the same dicta referred to by other courts, the 
Supreme Court observed that prevailing professional norms dating back to 
1982 advised attorneys to do what Padilla now requires.230 
C.  Evading Retroactivity 
Some courts have concluded that determining the retroactivity 
question is not necessary to decide the cases before them because the 
defendants could not clear the prejudice hurdle.231  In order to succeed in 
overturning a guilty plea under Hill v. Lockhart:  “[T]he defendant must 
show that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial.”232  Some courts have taken this tack 
because the Supreme Court, in Strickland, instructed as much:  “If it is 
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be 
followed.”233 
                                                                                                                 
at *3 (D. N.J. Oct. 19, 2010) (“Neither the Third Circuit nor the Supreme Court have ever 
ruled on whether or not an attorney must make a client aware of possible future immigration 
proceedings in order to comply with the 6th Amendment prior to the Padilla case.”). 
 228. See People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 892–93 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (finding 
that the dicta in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) did not provide a clear 
signal from the Supreme Court that dictated the result in Padilla). 
 229. See Haddad v. United States, No. 97-80150, 2010 WL 2884645, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 
July 20, 2010) (concluding that defendant could not show prevailing professional norms in 
1997 required the same as the Supreme Court now requires under Padilla).  The Haddad 
court also found it “unlikely” that Padilla will be applied retroactively and “equally 
unlikely” that defendant could show prejudice.  Id. 
 230. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) (citing the 1982 edition of the 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice for the practice guideline that counsel “should fully 
advise the defendant of [deportation] consequences”). 
 231. See United States v. Gutierrez Martinez, No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490, at *3 
(D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2010) (stating that in the face of Padilla retroactivity confusion, some 
courts have denied collateral relief because defendant could not show prejudice). 
 232. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) 
 233. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). 
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Courts have used different aspects of individual cases in disposing of 
defendants’ claims on prejudice grounds.  One court decided that a 
defendant’s claims obviated the need to discuss Padilla retroactivity.234  
Noting uncertainty on the issue, the court assumed without deciding that 
Padilla applies retroactively and denied the defendant’s claims on the 
prejudice prong.235  Another court first decided that Padilla does apply 
retroactively then denied relief on prejudice grounds.236  The finding of 
prejudice was based on the fact that both the judge and the plea agreement 
informed the defendant of deportation risks.237  Yet another court, after 
finding that Padilla did not apply retroactively, added that even if its 
nonretroactivity conclusion was wrong, the defendant could not show 
prejudice because he had other criminal charges subjecting him to 
deportation.238 
One court concluded the defendant could not show prejudice where the 
sentencing judge informed the defendant that deportation was likely.239  A 
wrinkle in that case was that the defendant was an illegal alien and so was 
subject to deportation regardless of the guilty plea.240  The court also found 
this fact sufficient to show a lack of prejudice.241 
                                                                                                                 
 234. See United States v. Obonaga, No. 10-CV-2951, 2010 WL 2710413, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010) (denying defendant’s claims because both his plea agreement and 
the judge, during allocution, expressly articulated that the defendant would be deported 
following a guilty plea). 
 235. See id. at *2 (“[E]ven if counsel erred in failing to inform him that he might get 
deported, [defendant] nevertheless ‘underst[ood]’ this risk before he pled guilty.”).  “It 
follows then that counsel’s alleged error did not prejudice [defendant].”  Id. 
 236. See Al Kokabani v. United States, No. 5:06-CR-207-FL, 2010 WL 3941836, at 
*6–7 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010) (finding Padilla applicable but granting summary judgment 
to the government because defendant was aware of the possible deportation consequences of 
his guilty plea). 
 237. See id. at *6 (“Thus, at the time he pled guilty, [p]etitioner clearly understood he 
was risking adverse immigration consequences by doing so.”). 
 238. See United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *3 (D. Neb. 
Nov. 9, 2010) (finding that the defendant would still be subject to deportation because if his 
federal guilty plea was vacated, his state charges would be reinstated). 
 239. See United States v. Gutierrez Martinez, No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490, at *4 
(D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2010) (“[D]uring the sentencing hearing, the [c]ourt informed Gutierrez 
Martinez he would likely be deported.”). 
 240. See id. (noting that defendant’s presentencing report listed him as being in the 
country illegally since 2003). 
 241. See id. (finding that where his guilty plea did not affect his deportation status, the 
defendant did not suffer prejudice because the deportation decision “would not have affected 
his decision whether to plead or go to trial”). 
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The Supreme Court indicated that courts might dispose of claims 
seeking relief under Padilla in this manner; when dismissing the floodgates 
concerns, it said:  “There is no reason to doubt that lower courts—now 
quite experienced with applying Strickland—can effectively and efficiently 
use its framework to separate specious claims from those with substantial 
merit.”242  Yet, prejudice has not been a uniformly insurmountable hurdle 
for petitioners; Roselva Chaidez successfully showed the court that she 
would prefer trial to the near automatic deportation resulting from her 
guilty plea.243  Importantly, Ms. Chaidez had received probation for her 
sentence, and her plea was entered without the benefit of a written plea 
agreement.244  Further, the government did not rebut her testimony that she 
would have preferred to risk prison over almost certain deportation in order 
to gain the chance to stay with her family.245 
A New York court found another way of avoiding retroactivity when it 
found that because the relevant immigration law was unclear, counsel’s 
nonadvice was bad practice but not constitutionally deficient.246  This 
decision appears to be consistent with Padilla’s limitation on its holding.247  
The New York court also distinguished the case before it in that the 
nonadvice on unclear law regarded completion of a drug treatment 
program.248  The court found counsel to be effective and distinguished the 
case from ineffective assistance of counsel cases because the defendant 
                                                                                                                 
 242. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
 243. See United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 6, 2010) (concluding that Ms. Chaidez would have gone to trial if she had known of 
the immigration consequences of the guilty plea). 
 244. See id. (“Chaidez entered her guilty plea without the benefit of a plea 
agreement.”). 
 245. See id. (giving particular credit to her testimony that the risk of jail was worth the 
opportunity to avoid deportation). 
 246. See People v. Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d 833, 845 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (“Given the 
particular circumstances of defendant’s plea and plea counsel’s accurate, albeit incomplete, 
advice, the Court finds that plea counsel satisfied her ‘more limited’ constitutional duty 
under Padilla to ‘do no more than advise a non-citizen client that pending criminal charges 
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.’” (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 
1483)). 
 247. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (“There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous 
situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or 
uncertain . . . .”).  “[Then], a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a 
noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 248. See Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 845 (“Defendant, of course, may have been in a 
better legal position to argue that plea counsel was deficient, had his guilty pleas been 
vacated upon his successful completion of drug treatment.”). 
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failed to uphold his end of the bargain and so placed himself in the 
precarious position.249 
D.  Beyond Immigration 
Some advocate expanding Padilla beyond the immigration context, 
arguing that other collateral consequences—such as loss of child custody, 
loss of government benefits, or loss of professional privileges—are all 
equally as serious as deportation.250  And, they argue, the reasoning behind 
the Padilla decision applies to those consequences with equal force.251 
Some appellate courts agree and have already applied Padilla beyond 
the immigration context.252  These decisions highlight how the retroactivity 
of Padilla might affect more than immigration law.  For example, the 
Eleventh Circuit extended Padilla’s reasoning to sex offender civil 
commitments in vacating Gary Bauder’s guilty plea.253  And the Georgia 
Court of Appeals agreed that the Padilla reasoning applies equally to sex 
offender registration.254 
                                                                                                                 
 249. See id. (“Defendant’s insurmountable problem is the particular facts of his case.  
He failed to complete treatment and is now reaping the precise consequences about which he 
was warned by plea counsel.”). 
 250. See Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 24 (arguing that certain collateral 
consequences beyond deportation also can result and also are of supreme importance to 
defendants); Roberts, supra note 6, at 170 (arguing that defendants require advice on 
collateral consequences to make an informed guilty plea); see also Commonwealth v. 
Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090, 1094–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (applying Padilla to the statutory 
loss of pension benefits from a criminal conviction). 
 251. See Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 24 (“The logic of Padilla, then, is not 
restricted to immigration consequences, but extends to the various ways in which Congress 
and the states have made criminal conviction legally operative in contexts beyond the formal 
sentence imposed by the court.”). 
 252. See Bauder v. Dept. of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (replacing 
“immigration” with “collateral” consequences in requiring counsel to advise defendants of 
civil commitment consequences to guilty pleas); Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535, 538–39 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (citing Padilla—without addressing retroactivity—to support a 
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel for inaccurately advising on the civil 
consequences of a no contest plea);  see also Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 23 (arguing 
that the logic of Padilla applies to many collateral consequences). 
 253. See Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1275 (“[T]he Supreme Court has noted that when the law 
is unclear a criminal defense attorney must advise his client that the ‘pending criminal 
charges may carry a risk of adverse [collateral] consequences.’” (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1483)). 
 254. See Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 387–89 (Ga. App. 2010) (concluding the 
factors deciding Padilla to be equally applicable to the consequences of sex offender 
registration). 
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Note that Padilla not only limited its language to immigration law, but 
its reasoning specifically rested on changes in immigration law.255  Further, 
the Court specifically labeled deportation as “uniquely difficult to classify 
as either a direct or collateral consequence.”256  The Court carefully applied 
Strickland only to deportation.257  Notably, in extending Padilla to civil 
commitment, the Eleventh Circuit, in quoting Padilla, changed the Court’s 
word “immigration” to “[collateral]” despite the Court’s refusal to apply the 
labels direct and collateral.258 
As these courts show, the reasoning of Padilla can be persuasive when 
applied to other contexts.259  Many collateral consequences result from law 
that is relatively clear and readily available to attorneys.260  Professional 
norms can often be shown to counsel attorneys to advise their clients on 
such consequences.261  And defendants surely would consider many 
collateral consequences, such as deportation, to be more punitive than the 
direct consequence of prison.262  As noted above, the Supreme Court 
continues to apply Strickland to new factual contexts, and doing so has yet 
to yield a new rule.263 
                                                                                                                 
 255. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82 (including deportation within the scope of the 
Sixth Amendment entitlement to effective assistance of counsel because of the increasing 
integration of immigration and criminal law). 
 256. Id. at 1476. 
 257. See id. at 1482 (“The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to 
evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 258. Bauder v. Dept. of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 259. See Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 24 (“The logic of Padilla, then, is not 
restricted to immigration consequences, but extends to the various ways in which Congress 
and the states have made criminal conviction legally operative in contexts beyond the formal 
sentence imposed by the court.”). 
 260. See id. at 25 (listing serious collateral consequences and the statutes that impose 
them). 
 261. See id. (“By the early 1980s, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Legal 
Status of Prisoners described collateral consequences as ‘archaic,’ and proposed that they 
were headed for extinction.”). 
 262. See id. (“[I]t might be said that for many people convicted of crime, the resulting 
status is the punishment.”). 
 263. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D. 
Cal. July 1, 2010) (“The Supreme Court has issued a number of relatively recent opinions 
applying the Strickland test in a variety of different factual contexts; none of these cases has 
been afforded new rule status under Teague.” (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 
(2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 
(2000))). 
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Perhaps the most important and practical consequence of Padilla is 
that courts and counsel, having read Padilla and applying its logic, will 
now, as a best practice, advise defendants of all foreseeable and relevant 
collateral consequences beyond deportation.264 
V.  Padilla Applies Retroactively 
In Padilla, seven Justices agreed that Strickland decided the case and 
that, at a minimum, a criminal defense attorney must advise her client that 
there may be adverse immigration consequences to pleading guilty.265  One 
wonders how the Court could have stated more clearly:  “Strickland applies 
to Padilla’s claim.”266 
Those who argue against retroactivity focus on the newness of 
Padilla’s holding.267  But the decision was new to the lower courts, not to 
the Supreme Court.268  The lower courts applied an as yet unnecessary 
distinction between direct and collateral consequences that cut against the 
prevailing professional norms that guide Strickland analyses.269  The 
Supreme Court did not overrule its own precedent, and a decision that 
overturns lower court precedent does not automatically create a new rule.270  
                                                                                                                 
 264. See Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 32 (predicting that after Padilla, courts and 
counsel—including prosecutors—will advise defendants of many collateral consequences in 
order to avoid appellate courts vacating guilty plea agreements). 
 265. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483, 1487 (requiring at least advice regarding possible 
deportation consequences). 
 266. Id. at 1482. 
 267. See United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *5 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 6, 2010) (finding support for concluding Padilla created a new rule in contrary, pre-
Padilla lower court holdings); Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 
528804, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“Other district courts . . . have held that Padilla did 
announce a [new rule], stressing that the result in Padilla was not dictated by precedent in 
the majority of federal courts . . . .”). 
 268. See Leading Case, supra note 137, at 204 (“While the decision is not inconsistent 
with the Court’s prior opinions, it overturns nearly unanimous agreement among state and 
federal courts.”).  “Despite Justice Scalia’s protestations, the majority is correct that the 
Court has never actually distinguished between direct and collateral consequences in the 
right to counsel context . . . .”  Id. at 204 n.64. 
 269. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“Whether that distinction is appropriate is a 
question we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”).   
“The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her 
client regarding the risk of deportation.”  Id. at 1482. 
 270. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (“The explicit overruling of an 
earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule; it is more difficult, however, to determine 
whether we announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases.”). 
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Padilla represents an example of a decision that overrules lower court 
precedent and nonetheless applies retroactively. 
Padilla applies retroactively because the Court straightforwardly 
applied Strickland, which, according to the Court, is clearly established 
law.271  It has been suggested that applying Strickland to new facts might 
never create a new rule for retroactivity purposes.272  The Court has 
previously stated:  “Strickland guides virtually all ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.”273  In fact, the Court has recently applied Strickland to new 
factual contexts and each case has been found to apply retroactively.274 
Strickland will often lead to new results because it exemplifies a rule 
of general applicability that requires a case-by-case examination of the 
facts.275  This type of rule will not create a new rule for Teague purposes 
when it is applied in novel factual contexts. 276  Strickland, the Court has 
said, because it is so clearly established as a rule, cannot be construed as 
breaking new ground or imposing new obligations on government.277  In 
Padilla, the Court acknowledged that lower courts are now “quite 
experienced with applying Strickland” and “can effectively and efficiently 
use its framework” to apply it in cases where counsel failed to advise a 
defendant about possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea.278 
                                                                                                                 
 271. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“It is past question that the rule 
set forth in Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law. . . .’” (quoting Wright v. 
West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 272. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308–09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Where the [retroactivity issue involves] a rule of this general application, a rule designed 
for the specific purposes of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent 
case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule . . . .”). 
 273. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he Strickland test provides sufficient guidance 
for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims . . . .”). 
 274. See Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Williams, Wiggins, 
and Rompilla are not new law under Teague . . . .  In [those cases], the Court did nothing 
more than apply Strickland’s standard to a specific set of circumstances . . . .” (citing 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 395; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Rompilla v. Beard, 
545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005))). 
 275. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he Strickland test ‘of necessity requires a case-
by-case examination of the evidence . . . .’” (quoting Wright, 505 U.S. at 308–09) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)). 
 276. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 308–09 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Where the 
[retroactivity issue involves] a rule of this general application, a rule designed for the 
specific purposes of evaluating myriad factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that 
yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule.”). 
 277. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“[I]t can hardly be said that 
recognizing the right to effective counsel ‘breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation 
on the States.’” (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301)). 
 278. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
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The Court did not state Teague as among its reasons for believing that 
Padilla will not open the floodgates to new litigation.279  Instead, the Court 
presumed “that counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice 
at the time their clients considered pleading guilty.”280  Additionally, the 
Court noted Strickland’s “high bar” that requires a defendant to “convince 
the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational 
under the circumstances.”281  Defendants willing to attempt that persuasion 
have the additional disincentive that collaterally attacking their guilty plea 
means “los[ing] the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the 
plea . . .,” which “ultimately . . . may result in a less favorable outcome for 
the defendant.”282  Despite disagreement over the reach of the majority 
opinion, neither the concurrence nor the dissent expressed alarm that there 
was no mention of Teague or retroactivity as a bar to future claims seeking 
relief under Padilla.283 And, as one court observed, the entire floodgates 
discussion would be unnecessary if the Court did not intend Padilla to 
apply retroactively.284 
Further, the Court’s own language plainly signals its anticipation 
(perhaps its foregone conclusion) that Padilla would apply retroactively:  
“It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on 
those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains.”285  The 
Court could not intend Padilla to apply only prospectively if it considered 
at least some effect on convictions “already obtained” as of the date of the 
decision.286 
The decision represents a straightforward application of Strickland to a 
new factual context, and it remains consistent with prevailing professional 
norms, which guide Strickland analyses.287  Thus, Padilla applies 
retroactively. 
                                                                                                                 
 279. See id. at 1484–86 (dismissing concerns that Padilla would open the floodgates to 
defendants attacking guilty pleas). 
 280. Id. at 1485. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 1485–86. 
 283. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F.Supp. 2d 896, 903 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“In 
Padilla, despite three separate opinions, no member of the Court even mentioned Teague or 
any retroactivity issue.”). 
 284. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7 (E.D. 
Cal. July 1, 2010) (“If the Court intended Padilla to be a new rule which would apply only 
prospectively, the entire ‘floodgates’ discussion would have been unnecessary.”). 
 285. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. 
 286. Id. (emphasis added). 
 287. See id. (“‘The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
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VI.  Conclusion 
After Padilla, attorneys are on notice that the Supreme Court might 
one day recognize other collateral consequences as rising to the same level 
of severity as deportation.  At a minimum, counsel should advise 
defendants of the relevant, potentially adverse, collateral consequences that 
might result from their conviction.  When such consequences result from 
succinct and straightforward law, counsel should be careful to provide 
correct advice to their clients.  Prosecutors too, in order to protect the 
finality, accuracy, and fairness of guilty pleas should include in plea 
agreements advice and disclosures of the relevant collateral consequences 
that are likely to result from the defendant pleading guilty. 
As Justice Stevens said, “By bringing [all] consequences into this 
process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements 
that better satisfy the interests of both parties.”288 
                                                                                                                 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))). 
 288. Id. at 1486. 
